

**Good humanitarian donorship and the European Union:  
Issues and options**

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## 1. Introduction

The past decade has seen significant changes in the humanitarian policy landscape. These relate to changes in the origins and dynamics of humanitarian emergencies in a context of deepening globalization, fragmentation of conflict dynamics and increasingly violent war economies. They also reflect major changes in the size and shape of international response to these crises, as they have become linked to wider agendas of conflict management, development and more recently counter-terrorism. Changes at both levels have posed significant challenges to traditional humanitarian principles. This paper, commissioned by the Government of Ireland, examines one aspect of these, namely the role of official humanitarian aid donors in upholding humanitarian principles.

During the 1990s, specialist emergency aid departments in donor governments faced an unprecedented expansion in their funding. The context within which partner organizations were working also became increasingly complex and risky. At the same time, the goals of official humanitarian assistance broadened significantly beyond relief to include developmental and conflict reduction goals.

This rapid expansion in the size, scope and complexity of official humanitarian action occurred without the benefits of clearly established norms to which policy-makers could appeal. While many of their key partners, particularly in the Red Cross movement and NGO community had long sought to guide their work in line with an established body of law and principles, the application of these principles to official donor policy remained poorly articulated. In contrast to official development aid, where there has been a long tradition of inter-governmental work to promote harmonization of policy and lesson learning, there was little guidance available regarding how to best define and manage official humanitarian assistance policy.

In June 2003, there was an international effort, led by the Government of Sweden, to redress this gap and to establish a set of basic norms and principles to inform good donorship in the humanitarian arena (see Annex 1). Donor commitment to this process signalled recognition of the fact that humanitarian action is a distinct form of international policy, and of official development cooperation in particular. It also acknowledged that the way in which official humanitarian assistance is managed and allocated affects the capacity of the international humanitarian system as a whole to respond in a principled and effective manner.

This paper details the context against which the good humanitarian donorship agenda has emerged and the challenges to which it aims to respond. It comprises three main parts. *Section 2* summarises the key challenges that official humanitarian aid donors have confronted over the past decade, and trends in their response. It analyses the trend towards increasing ‘bilateralisation’ of humanitarian policy, where official donors are becoming more proximate to humanitarian decision-making and operations. *Section 3* examines the tensions that have emerged as measures to professionalise the management of official humanitarian aid resources have coincided with an increasingly complex international political environment. *Section 4* concludes the paper. It reviews the ways in which the good humanitarian donorship agenda might evolve and identifies some of the opportunities and challenges it poses for the European humanitarian aid community in particular.

## 2. Official humanitarian donorship: challenges and trends

During the 1990s, a number of key challenges emerged in the humanitarian sector that demanded new responses from the donor community. These included:

- *An increased demand for international engagement in humanitarian crises.* Driven in part by the optimism of a new world order in the post-Cold War era, by media coverage and by the willingness to use military solutions to enforce access, the space for humanitarian action in situations of active conflict opened up during the 1990s.
- *A growing recognition of the risk that aid might be used by belligerents to sustain conflicts, and of the need to ensure that military, political and assistance interventions were deployed in support of humanitarian and conflict reduction objectives.* As aid was increasingly delivered inside war zones, rather than on the periphery, the risks that it could be coopted or looted, and aid workers killed, increased significantly.
- *A rapid expansion in the number and type of organizations engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.* During the 1980s a wide variety of NGOs developed their capacity to provide a range of humanitarian services to populations around the globe. During the 1990s, the proliferation of humanitarian NGOs was accompanied by a new group of actors, including the military, civil defence and private companies in the humanitarian arena. In this context, the specialized agencies of the UN and the Red Cross Movement became just one among many potential mechanisms for disbursement of official humanitarian aid resources.
- *Increasing pressure within public administrations to demonstrate the results of public expenditure, and to ensure that funds are used efficiently and accountably.*

Combined, these various pressures resulted in a number of very specific adjustments in the way in which official humanitarian assistance was promoted, organized and managed. Specifically:

- *There was a rapid and substantial increase in expenditure on official humanitarian assistance.* In real terms, in the period 1990-2000, official humanitarian aid (oha) doubled from \$2.1 billion to \$5.9 billion. As a proportion of total official development assistance (oda) it increased from 5.83% to 10.5%.

*Increased emphasis on ensuring the effectiveness of operational partners, and a tightening of procedures to strengthen their accountability.* This was reflected in the introduction of new management mechanisms, including results-based management, and the formulation of new contractual frameworks with which to govern donor-partner relations. It was reflected too in some donors' expanding their presence and engagement at field level in

order to assess need, guide decisions regarding the selection of operational partners and ensure effective oversight of humanitarian operations.

- *Increased emphasis on ensuring integrated responses to conflict-related humanitarian crises.* Integrated responses resulted in humanitarian assistance actors becoming linked to political and military strategy. In some cases, there was interest in exploring how aid, including humanitarian aid, might be used to reinforce security and to reduce conflict. This in turn implied an increased capacity within governments, and within international organisations such as the EU and UN, to ensure coordinated cross-departmental working, and an ability to analyse complex political and humanitarian issues in recipient countries.

Combined, these trends resulted in what has been called a ‘bilateralisation’ of humanitarian financing, management and operations<sup>1</sup>, in other words, donors seeking much greater proximity and influence over humanitarian decision-making and in some cases operations themselves. The era in which donors relied virtually unconditionally on the UN and Red Cross Movement to shape humanitarian strategy and operations was over.

In seeking to increase their own influence over humanitarian aid programming, donor bodies were responding to the need to satisfy the demands of the new public management and to respond to the specific challenges of providing aid in conflict-affected and contested environments. They did so too, in response to the findings of a series of evaluations that revealed some critical failures of humanitarian organizations to respond effectively and accountably.

There is significant variation between official donors in terms of the ways in which they have responded to various pressures to tighten procedures and scrutiny of their humanitarian spending. In broad terms, the following trends are evident, however:

- The ‘bilateralisation’ of humanitarian aid spending (see Box 1). In other words, rather than delegating responsibility for resource allocation to multilateral organizations by providing unearmarked funds, official donors now wish to influence more precisely how, where and on what their money is spent.
- An increased role for donors in the coordination of specific emergencies, in relation to specific humanitarian organizations. In the case of the EU, the development of the Humanitarian Aid Committee is one example of inter-donor working. More broadly, the Montreux forum has also emerged as an important point for annual inter-donor dialogue ;
- Tougher contractual and managerial regimes to scrutinize the performance of implementing partners

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<sup>1</sup> Macrae J et al (2002) ‘Uncertain power: the changing role of official donors in humanitarian action’ *HPG Report 12*, Overseas Development Institute, London.  
The term bilateralisation reflects changes in the *form* of official aid, the *systems* by which it is managed, and the *channels* through which it is delivered.

- An increased donor presence at field level, including increased capacity to deliver assistance, in some cases using military personnel.

**Box 1: ‘Bilateralisation’ of humanitarian aid spending: unpacking the different components.**

*‘Multilateral’ aid is defined as unearmarked contributions to multilateral organizations. All other aid is by*

The majority of humanitarian organizations have welcomed increased donor attention and professionalism in humanitarian affairs, recognizing that the leverage that donors bring can help to enhance humanitarian access and to provide momentum for reform within the humanitarian system.

However, these trends have also attracted controversy. Concerns have been expressed that, rather than strengthening the effectiveness of humanitarian action, it might be undermined by some types of donor engagement. In particular, there is concern that increased donor proximity and control over humanitarian decision making could:

- undermine the independence of humanitarian organizations and compromise their neutrality.
- reinforce a tendency towards concentration of humanitarian spending in high profile crises, at the cost of less visible emergencies where levels of need remain very high.
- further fragment the humanitarian effort by undermining multilateral coordination mechanisms and overly projectising response;
- create perverse incentives for partner organizations by encouraging them to work in some places rather than others, favour low risk projects and to underreport problems;

These concerns have been heightened by the fact that, as well as reflecting demands for increasing quality and accountability, the trends towards increasing donor influence in humanitarian affairs have also coincided with an increasingly complex political environment. The 1990s saw unprecedented levels of military intervention in countries affected by conflict related crises. Initially designed to protect the delivery of relief supplies, the use of force has been expanded to include wider conflict reduction and conflict prevention objectives. Kosovo (1999) marked the climax of this trend towards ‘humanitarian’ intervention. Counter-terror operations in Afghanistan (post 9/11) and more recently Iraq (2003/4) have also been portrayed in part as humanitarian interventions. Where international military forces have been deployed there have been particularly high levels of humanitarian aid spending, an increasing military involvement in humanitarian response, and much stronger donor presence and influence over humanitarian operations.

Given the wide variation in the policy frameworks within which humanitarian policy is defined and governed, the varied foreign policy positions of major donors, and the contexts in which humanitarian assistance is delivered, it is of course impossible to generalize as to the validity of the concern that increasing donor involvement in humanitarian policy-making and operations necessarily results in politicization of humanitarian response. The variation of policy frameworks between different donors working in different environments over time is itself a problem, making it difficult to predict the type and scale of response likely to come from different donors in relation to different crises and over time.

The volatility of the humanitarian policy environment is increased by the fact that the global humanitarian aid budget is voluntary and runs according to extremely short funding cycles. Some donor bodies reallocate earmarked funds at short notice to respond to new crises. For example, in Autumn 2001, several major donors reallocated existing contributions to multilateral partners to focus on Afghanistan. This had the effect of leaving these agencies unable to meet their budgets for less visible crises elsewhere. Other donors have greater ability to draw on contingency reserves and/or draw down additional resources to support response to new crises.

Until 2003, there were no norms to provide consistent basis against which the policy and response of individual donor bodies could be formulated, managed and evaluated<sup>2</sup>. In contrast to development cooperation and other areas of public policy, mechanisms for scrutiny of donor policy were extremely weak in relation to humanitarian affairs. In other words, at least until 2003, taken in aggregate official humanitarian policy was characterized by a high level of volatility in funding flows, fluctuating and diffuse objectives and weak governance<sup>3</sup>. All this in a context of rising budgets.

### **3. Good Humanitarian Donorship and the European humanitarian assistance agenda:**

In June 2003, the major OECD country donors came together to agree for the first time a series of norms and principles to guide official humanitarian donorship (see Annex 1). As such, it provides a framework against which current efforts to ensure informed donorship can be managed.

The agenda that was laid out in Stockholm was both modest and significant. It was modest in the sense that it was designed to provide a framework to govern spending a tiny proportion of public spending and wealth.<sup>4</sup> It was significant in that it made clear that while modest in many ways, the US\$6 billion dollars spent on humanitarian

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<sup>2</sup> Importantly, NGOs had been developing some norms against which their performance could be evaluated in the shape of the Codes of Conduct and the Sphere initiative. These did not, however, bind donor behaviour.

<sup>3</sup> See Macrae J (2002) op cit; Smillie I and L Minear (2003) 'The quality of money: donor behavior in humanitarian financing', Humanitarianism and War Project, The Feinstein International Famine Center, Boston.

<sup>4</sup> In 2001 DAC member countries gave 0.023% of GNI in humanitarian aid). Source: Development Initiatives (2003), Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003, Development Initiatives, London

assistance was distinctive, and in particular was (or at least ought to be) independent of wider political considerations.

The principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) sought to clarify the essential purpose of this spending, and to enable policy-makers in donor countries to disburse funding in the most equitable, efficient and effective way. They also provided a means through which some of the major tensions that had arisen as donors had assumed a more prominent role as humanitarian actors could be addressed (see table 1 as an illustrative example of how the GHD principles relate to core dilemmas and issues).

Progress in implementing the GHD agenda will be reported on elsewhere in the papers and presentations prepared for the Dublin meeting. Here, it is possible to anticipate how the GHD might influence official humanitarian policy among EU member states and within the Commission, and to explore how the European humanitarian community might work together to take forward this agenda globally. In particular, it is possible to identify some potential issues for consideration in the lead up to the October meeting in Ottawa, which will provide an opportunity to review progress on implementing the GHD agenda.

#### *The importance of a European humanitarian vision*

While the US is the single largest bilateral donor (accounting for approximately 36% of official humanitarian aid in 2001), humanitarian assistance from members of the European Union, including that channelled through ECHO, dominates overall (accounting for approximately 47% of official humanitarian aid in 2001). In other words, if all EU member states and ECHO committed to implementing the vision laid out at Stockholm, this would have tremendous impact on humanitarian work globally.

#### *The GHD agenda might provide a good basis on which to promote harmonization of humanitarian policy across the EU.*

Already, a number of member states are exploring how to use the framework established in Stockholm as a basis for formulating their own bilateral policy frameworks. Exchanging experience across member states would therefore be useful, particularly in relation to the accession states. In particular, the GHD framework might provide a basis for dialogue between Member States to identify and establish good practice in humanitarian donorship. The following aspects of humanitarian policy are likely to be priorities in doing this:

#### *Clarification, including in law (EU Constitution & domestic legislation), of the objectives of official humanitarian assistance and the principles that inform official donorship;*

ECHO currently has one of the strongest policy frameworks of any donor body. The 1996 Regulation articulates clearly the objectives of ECHO's aid programme, its commitment to impartial allocation of resources and its political neutrality. The draft EU Constitution largely reaffirms this commitment to the impartiality of EU humanitarian aid. Significantly, however, there remains ambiguity in the text regarding the relationship between the European humanitarian assistance programme,

the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other European instruments that could be deployed to deliver humanitarian assistance, including through civil defence.

*Refining and implementing methods and procedures for ensuring needs-based allocation of official humanitarian aid resources;*

ECHO has made important steps forward on developing such a methodology. The Implementation Group for the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative is actively concerned to identify and promote best practice in this regard, in particular through the ‘pilot CAPs’ underway in Burundi and DRC. Discussions on equitable allocation should also consider the possibility that additional resources may be required to ensure that the sum of needs be met (Darcy and Hofmann, 2003).

*Clarifying across the EU and within member states the role of the military in humanitarian operations.*

While ECHO is the main humanitarian actor within the Commission and the Union, humanitarian affairs and humanitarian assistance more specifically are of increasing interest to a range of EU actors and institutional forums, including external relations and the military. Ensuring understanding and commitment to the principles of GHD throughout the Commission, European Parliament and Council of Ministers, as well as in relevant standing committees, could provide a means of reaffirming the commitment of the European Union to the values of humanitarian law and principles whatever the mechanism through which it chooses to act.

*Ensuring accountable donorship.* There is considerable scope for strengthening scrutiny of official humanitarian policy within Europe through parliamentary, evaluation and audit-type routes. There is also recognition of the particular added value of system-wide evaluations. The on-going work of the Development Assistance Committee to define criteria to inform peer review of official humanitarian policy could be used to inform such processes in relation to ECHO and Member States.

*Promoting a European debate on humanitarian action*

EU member states and ECHO are also in a particularly strong position in terms of their ability to lead and promote debate internationally on the values and principles of humanitarian action. They can do so both through wider understanding of the roles and responsibilities of member states in upholding and enforcing adherence to International Humanitarian Law and principles, and through the very diverse range of civil society organizations that exist to promote them. While the value of development education has been widely established for decades, there has been little structured and sustained dialogue among European publics regarding humanitarian action, despite their generosity in responding to emergencies. The principles of GHD provide a framework within which European governments could engage in such a dialogue individually and collectively with key partners, parliamentarians and the media, to articulate a shared vision of humanitarian action in an increasingly complex world. Such work might be unified through, for example, a Parliamentary Commission to explore the future of European humanitarian action.



#### **4. Conclusion**

Official donors are no longer simply the chequebook for the international humanitarian system, passively sponsoring the work of a relatively small group of international and multilateral organisations. Official humanitarian donors are now assuming a much more assertive and complex array of roles and responsibilities in the humanitarian domain.

In doing so they are responding to the demands to demonstrate and account for the effectiveness of public policy, their obligations under international law, and a set of broader foreign policy objectives. In different ways, each of these pressures promote the trend towards ‘bilateralisation’ of humanitarian policy. These trends do not necessarily undermine donors’ ability to uphold and enforce international humanitarian law and principles, but nor do they automatically protect them. The Good Humanitarian Donorship agenda provides the beginnings of a framework within which donors can articulate both their commitment to those principles and means of operationalising them in their day to day work.

By virtue of their very large contribution to the international humanitarian system, European donors are in a particularly influential position to take forward this agenda. The drafting of the new Constitution, the evolution of the CFSP and the accession of new states makes this discussion particularly significant. Combined, these different events provide an opportunity to reflect on how the European Union and individual Member States aspire to fulfil their humanitarian responsibilities. Their assistance programmes provide a key mechanism through which to demonstrate very practically their commitment to upholding humanitarian values and principles, and to translate the aspirations of Stockholm into reality.

## Annex 1: Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship

Endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003

### Objectives and definition of humanitarian action

- 1 . The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
- 2 . Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
- 3 . Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

### General principles

- 4 . Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.
- 5 . While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.
- 6 . Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
- 7 . Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.

- 8 . Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
- 9 . Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.
- 10 . Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

*Good practices in donor financing,  
management and accountability*

*(a) Funding*

- 11 . Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.
- 12 . Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations.
- 13 . While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.
- 14 . Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

*(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation*

- 15 . Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.

- 16 . Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.
- 17 . Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.
- 18 . Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.
- 19 . Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.
- 20 . Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

*(c) Learning and accountability*

- 21 . Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.
- 22 . Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
- 23 . Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

Issue	GHD Principle and Good Practice	Mechanism, including GHD Implementation Plan
Donor accountability	<p>P7. Request implementing humanitarian organizations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response. P15: Request that implementing humanitarian organizations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action. GP 21-23: Support learning and accountability initiatives; encourage regular evaluations; ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness and transparency in donor reporting on AHO spending and encourage the development of standardized formats for such reporting.</p>	<p>IP 2: DAC Humanitarian Peer Reviews and evaluation. IP3: Harmonisation of reporting requirements and management demands placed upon implementing organizations. IP 4: Agree upon a comprehensive common definition of official humanitarian assistance for reporting and statistical purposes.</p>
Integration agenda	<p>P1-3: Affirmation of essential purpose of humanitarian action, including, P2: autonomy of objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented. P17. Offer support to facilitate safe humanitarian access. P19: Affirm primary position of civilian organizations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict.</p>	<p>IP3: Harmonisation of reporting requirements and management demands placed upon implementing organisations; GP20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of military and civil Defence assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.</p>
Inequitable resource allocation	<p>P 6: Allocate humanitarian needs and on the basis of needs assessment. GP 11: Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises. GP13: explore possibility of reducing or enhancing the flexibility of</p>	<p>Strengthen needs assessment by agencies; improved tracking of expenditure GP14: Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing to the UN CAP and to Red Cross / Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the</p>

Issue	GHD Principle and Good Practice	Mechanism, including GHD Implementation Plan
	earmarking and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.	formulation of the CHAP as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritization and co-ordination in complex emergencies.
Politicisation of humanitarian action	P1-3: Affirmation of essential purpose of humanitarian action and the principles that guide response, including independence, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.	IP 2: DAC Humanitarian Peer Reviews and evaluation
Defining the scope of humanitarian action and ensuring policy harmonization	P1-4: the objectives and definition of humanitarian action, and respect for and promotion of the implementation of IHL, refugee law and human rights.	IP3: Harmonisation of reporting requirements and management demands placed upon implementing organizations. IP 4: Agree upon a comprehensive common definition of official humanitarian assistance for reporting and statistical purposes.
Universality vs Western construct		IP5: Participating donors will seek to promote the wider use among all official donors of the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship.
Breakdown in trust between donors and humanitarian partners	P1-3: Affirmation of essential purpose of humanitarian action and the principles that guide response. P15 Request that implementing organizations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action. P12: Strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organizations. P13: while stressing the importance of transparent and	IP 2: DAC Humanitarian Peer Reviews and evaluation. IP3: Harmonisation of reporting requirements and management demands placed upon implementing organizations.

Issue	GHD Principle and Good Practice	Mechanism, including GHD Implementation Plan
	strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organizations, Donors are to explore the possibility o reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.	
Humanitarian diplomacy and protection	P4: Respect and promote the implementation of IHL, refugee law and human rights.	P17: Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.
Bilateralisation	P13: while stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organizations, Donors are to explore the possibility o reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements	GP14: Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing to the UN CAP and to Red Cross / Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of the CHAP as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritization and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

